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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY FROM 
A COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
For the first time in the sphere of international criminal law, and unlike the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters or the Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
Tribunals, Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
provides a general definition for the mental element required to trigger the criminal 
responsibility of individuals for serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
The first paragraph of Article 30 stresses that unless otherwise provided, a person 
shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
ratione materiae of the International Criminal Court „only if the material elements 
are committed with intent and knowledge‟. The second paragraph identifies the 
exact meaning of intent, whereas the third paragraph defines the meaning of 
knowledge.   
At first sight, it appears that the explicit words of Article 30 are sufficient to 
put an end to a long lasting debate regarding the mens rea enigma which has 
confronted the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc Tribunals for the last decade, but 
this is not true. Scholars disagree regarding the exact meaning of intent under 
Article 30. Some view Article 30 as encompassing the three categories of dolus, 
namely, dolus directus of the first and second degree and dolus eventualis. Others 
hold the opinion that the plain meaning of Article 30 is confined to dolus directus of 
the first degree (intent in stricto sensu) and dolus directus of the second degree 
(indirect or oblique intent).   
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At present, the only guidance given by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) regarding the meaning of „intent and knowledge‟ as set out in Article 30 is 
the decision rendered by Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC I) of 29 January 2007 in the 
Lubanga case.
1
 There, the PTC I asserted that the cumulative reference to „intent‟ 
and „knowledge‟ as provided for in Article 30 requires the existence of a volitional 
element on the part of the accused, and that volitional element encompasses three 
degrees of dolus, namely, dolus directus of the first and second degrees and dolus 
eventualis. 
This paper examines in depth the elements of culpability as set out in Article 
30 from a comparative criminal law perspective as well as the inter-relationship 
between Article 30 and other provisions of the ICC Statute in light of the Lubanga 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges.
2
 The comparative study undertaken in 
this paper is significant since the codification of Article 30 – as with other 
provisions under the Statute – was conducted by several codifiers who brought their 
own legal cultural experience to the drafting of this provision.
3
 The paper concludes 
with some suggestions regarding the mens rea standards which are deemed 
appropriate to trigger the criminal responsibility of individuals for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law.  
                                                 
1
 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Décision sur la confirmation 
des charges, (Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges), 29 January 2007. 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 For the drafting history of Article 30 of the ICC Statute see Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in 
International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Elements of 
Offences, 12 CRIM L. FORUM 291 (2001).  
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1. ANATOMY OF ARTICLE 30 OF THE ICC STATUTE 
  
Elements Analysis – Mental Elements and their Objects  
 
In order to hold a person criminally responsible and liable for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, it must be established that the material elements of the offence 
were committed with intent and knowledge. This is expressly mentioned in paragraph 
1 of Article 30 of the ICC Statute: 
 
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the 
material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
4
  
 
It is clear that the ICC Statute lacks a general provision regarding the definition of the 
actus reus or the material elements of the crime, and yet leaves the door open with 
respect to what should be understood by the phrase „material elements‟ as it appears 
in Article 30(1). This deficiency, however, is remedied by paragraphs (2) and (3) of 
the same Article which set out the relationship between the mental elements and the 
material elements of an offence – expressly referred to as conduct, consequence and 
circumstance.
5
 In so doing, Article 30 sets itself aside from the broad notion of 
„materials elements‟ as presented in the Model Penal Code or German literature.6 The 
significance of this provision is that it assigns different levels of mental element to 
each of the material elements of the crime in question. This is a remarkable shift from 
                                                 
4
 Rome Statute, Article 30. Contra see Thomas Weigend, Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-perpetration 
in the Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 6 JICJ 471 (2008) at 482. 
5
 See Erkin Gadirov and Roger Clark, Article 9 – Elements of Crimes, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS‟ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 505-
529 (Otto Triffterer, ed., 2nd edn., 2008) at 513. As a result of the omission of the earlier draft of then 
Article 28 on actus reus „causation‟ can hardly be seen as a requisite material element in the Statute 
(ibid). For more details on the element of causation see ibid at 521-522. See also Otto Triffterer, 
Causality, as a Separate Element of the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility as Expressed in Article 28 
Rome Statute?, 15 LJIL 179 (2002). See also Donald k. Piragoff and Darryl Robinson, Article 30 – 
Mental Element, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
OBSERVERS‟ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 849 (Otto Triffterer, ed., 2nd edn., 2008) at 851-852.  
6
 Section 1.13(10) of the Model Penal Code. For more information on the Model Penal Code, see 
Herbert Wechsler, Codification of the Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 
COLUM L. REV. 1425 (1968); Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of A Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. 
REV. 1097 (1952). See also Jerome Hall, The Proposal to Prepare a Model Penal Code, 4 JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 91 (1951-1952). For the recent work by the American Law Institute on the MPC, see 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, (The American Law Institute, 
1985). As for the definition of material elements in the German literature particularly, what so called 
the theory on negative legal elements of the offence or „Lehre von den negativen 
Tatbestandsmerkmalen‟, see VOLKER KREY, Deutsches Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. 2, (2003) at 
15, 17.  
 4 
an „offence analysis‟ approach to an „element analysis‟ approach.7 Under „offence 
analysis‟, crimes are defined in general terms; intentional crimes, reckless crimes and 
negligent crimes, whereas „element analysis‟ in contrast, recognizes that a single 
crime definition may require a different culpable state of mind for each objective 
element of the offence. This approach is similar to the one adopted by the Model 
Penal Code, in 1962, by the American Law Institute.
8
 The Model Penal Code‟s 
approach is based on the view that, unless some element of mental culpability is 
proved with respect to each material element of the offence, no valid criminal 
conviction may be obtained.
9
 This is explicitly stated in § 2.02(4) of the Model Penal 
Code (MPC) which is entitled „prescribed culpability requirement applies to all 
material elements‟. Section 2.02(4) of the MPC reads as follows: „When the law 
defining an offence prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the 
commission of an offence, without distinguishing among the material elements 
thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offence, unless a 
contrary purpose plainly appears.‟10  
  Under the ICC Statute, „element analysis‟, or the „rule of mens rea coverage‟, 
has to be applied cautiously since culpability terms (a)  are defined in Article 30; (b) 
are stated in the definition of particular crimes (genocide „with intent to‟, war crimes 
of „wilful killing‟) or; (c) are stated in the Elements of Crimes.11  
 
Different Culpability Terms Defined in Relation to Each Objective Element  
 
Article 30 of the ICC Statute – the default rule – assigns different levels of culpability 
to each of the material elements of the crimes under the subject matter jurisdiction of 
the Court. Unless otherwise provided, a person has intent in relation to conduct if „that 
                                                 
7
 Kelt and von Hebel used the phrase „material elements and the principle of mens rea coverage‟ 
instead of „element analysis‟, see Maria Kelt and Herman von Hebel, General Principles of Criminal 
Law and the Elements of Crimes, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, 19-40 (Roy Lee ed., 2001). 
8
 See the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Vol. 1, (The 
American Law Institute, 1985). It is worth pointing out that within United States there are fifty-two 
American criminal codes, and it is often difficult to state „the American rule on any point of criminal 
law‟. 
9
 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 2.02, supra note 6, at 229, n. 1. 
10
 Model Penal Code, § 2.02(4). 
11
 Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, 1
st
 Sess., Official Record (adopted by the Assembly of 
States Parties on September 9, 2002). 
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person means to engage in the conduct‟.12 According to the same provision, a person 
is said to have intended a consequence not only if „that person means to cause that 
consequence‟ but also if he „is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events‟.13 Surprisingly, Article 30 assigns two different culpable states of mind for the 
consequence element, namely intent and knowledge. Either of these culpable mental 
states is sufficient to cover the consequence element. Yet, a person who intentionally 
engages in a proscribed conduct with awareness that a consequence will occur in the 
ordinary course of events may incur criminal liability for any of the crimes within the 
ratione materiae of the Court (unless otherwise provided). Yet, one might argue that 
dolus directus of second degree or oblique intent is sufficient mens rea to trigger the 
criminal responsibility of individuals for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law under the ICC Statute.  
As for the circumstance element – a material element which is related to the 
knowledge or awareness of a defendant and not to his intention – the ICC Statute 
required a culpable state of knowledge (knowing standards). This means the 
defendant‟s awareness of the existence of a circumstance.14  
Thus, the general rule under Article 30 is the full coverage of the material 
elements by the corresponding mental elements. Problems may arise regarding special 
types of material elements (I will name them quasi-material elements) which do not 
fall under the three categories of the materials elements mentioned above and 
accordingly may not be covered by the default rule of Article 30 – intent and/or 
knowledge. There are three different types of these quasi-material elements. The first 
type is the quasi-material element of a „legal character‟. For instance, Article 8(2)(a) 
of the ICC Statute requires that a victim be a protected person under the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. According to some commentators the default rule of Article 30 
does not apply to such factual elements since this provision „does not require proof 
that the accused knew the relevant law or that he or she correctly completed such a 
legal evaluation.‟15 Yet, one might argue that Article 32(2) has no role to play in such 
situations. It is not clear, however, whether this is considered a mistake of law, or a 
                                                 
12
 Rome Statute, Article 30(2)(a).  
13
 Rome Statute, Article 30(2)(b). 
14
 Rome Statute, Article 30(3).  
15
 Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 – Mental Element, supra note 5, at 852-853.  
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mistake of fact or a combination of both – mistake of mixed fact and law.16 This issue 
will be examined later in detail when we discuss the relationship between Articles 30 
and 32 of the ICC Statute. 
 The second type of quasi-material element involves a normative aspect or a 
value judgment.
17
 The requirement of „serious injury to body‟ as provided for in 
Article 7(1)(k) – crimes against humanity of other inhuman acts – and  Article 
8(2)(a)(iii) – grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of wilfully causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or health – is an example of a quasi-material 
element which involve a value judgment . In such case, the prosecution is not entitled 
to demonstrate that the accused „correctly completed a normative evaluation.‟18 
Otherwise, the accused‟s subjective opinion would be the sole determinative factor in 
finding whether a crime had been committed.
19
  
 The third category includes circumstantial elements; the widespread or 
systematic attack for crimes against humanity and the existence of an armed conflict 
for war crimes. This type of element was referred to during the negotiations of the 
Elements of Crimes as „contextual elements‟.20 If this element is to be considered 
material element, it should as a rule – element analysis – be covered by a 
corresponding mental element. There is a consensus among scholars that such 
contextual element is related to the broader context that renders the crime an 
international crime, and accordingly the default rule – intent and knowledge – does 
not apply to them.
21
   
                                                 
16
 See the very recent and challenging discussion on the subject by Kevin Jon Heller, Mistake of Legal 
Element, the Common Law, and Article 32 of the Rome Statute, A Critical Analysis, 6 JICJ 419 (2008).   
17
 Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 – Mental Element, supra note 5, at 852-853.  
18
 Ibid, at 853.  
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, 1
st
 Sess., Official Record (adopted by the Assembly of 
States Parties on September 9, 2002). 
21
 Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 – Mental Element, supra note 5, at 853. Maria Kelt and Herman 
von Hebel, What Are the Elements of Crimes?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS 
OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, 13-18 (Roy Lee ed., 2001): „there was 
considerable debate [during the negotiations of the elements of crimes] as to whether they [the 
contextual elements] really were “material elements” – and if so whether they were (fully) covered by 
the mental element of article 30 – or whether they formed a separate type of element. Some participants 
thought, for example, that there might be a category of elements that are neither material nor mental, 
but which should be considered “jurisdictional” or “merely jurisdictional”. Ultimately, however, an 
explicit decision as to whether these elements were “material elements” became unnecessary, as for 
each contextual element some corresponding mental element [however, lower than that provided for 
under Article 30] was specified in most cases, which, as a result, […] rendered the other question 
moot‟. 
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2. DIFFERENT DEGREES OF MENTAL ELEMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 30 
 
Article 30 is in line with the Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. This 
provision, however, goes further, assuring that the mental element consists of two 
components: a volitional component of intent and a cognitive component of 
knowledge. In so doing, Article 30 confirms the evolutionary developments of the law 
of mens rea under the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals which demand that, for 
the imposition of criminal responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, both a cognitive and volitional component must be incorporated 
into the legal standard.
22
  
 
The Meaning of Intent  
 
Generally speaking, in criminal law the word „intent‟ or the adjective „intentionally‟ 
have traditionally not been limited to the narrow definition of purpose, aim, or design. 
According to common law tradition, a person is considered to intend the consequence 
not only if (i) his conscious objective is to cause that consequence, but also (ii) if he 
acts with knowledge that the consequence is virtually certain to occur as a result of his 
conduct.
23
 The term „intent‟ as set out in Article 30 has two different meanings, 
depending upon whether the material element related to conduct or consequence. A 
person has intent in relation to conduct, if he „means to engage in the conduct‟,24 
whereas in relation to consequence, a person is said to have intent if „that person 
means to cause that consequence‟ or „is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course 
of events‟.25  
 
Intent in Relation to Conduct  
 
Pursuant to Article 30(2)(a) of the ICC Statute, a person is said to have intent in 
relation to conduct if that person means to engage in the conduct. This definition has 
                                                 
22
 See Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, (Case No. IT-95-14-A) Judgment, July 29, 2004, para 41. See 
also Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, 30 June 2006 (Orić Trial 
Judgment), para. 279.  
23
 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, (3rd edn., 2001) at 119; See also 
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, §§ 16, 18  (2nd  edn., 1961). 
24
 Rome Statute, Article 30(2)(a).  
25
 Rome Statute, Article 30(2)(b). 
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two aspects. First, the relationship between intent and conduct as set out in Article 
30(2)(a), „seems closer to what common lawyers often think of the “volitional” part of 
an “act” (deliberately pulling a trigger as opposed to a reflex action, for example).‟26 
Yet, „the conduct must be the result of a voluntary action on the part of the 
perpetrator.‟27 Professor Roger Clark, however, noted that knowledge is not defined in 
relation to conduct and this „may create some mischief later.‟28 It is submitted that 
unless relevant circumstances are known that qualify the action as illegal it cannot be 
said that the person intends the conduct.
29
 Generally, the prosecution must prove that 
the defendant had knowledge of facts which would make the conduct illegal, but 
ordinarily is not required to prove the defendant‟s awareness of the legal 
consequences of the conduct (e.g. that the conduct was illegal).
30
  
Second, with regard to conduct, the drafting history of the Rome Statute 
shows that there was a strong will to include within the Statute an article defining 
conduct as an act or omission.
31
 The Draft Statute prepared by the Preparatory 
Committee in 1996 included a provision headed „Actus reus’ (act and/ or omission)32 
which was modified at the February 1997 session and submitted to the Rome 
Conference.
33
 The term „conduct‟ was defined under then Article 28 to „constitute 
either an act or an omission, or a combination thereof‟. The Rome Conference had 
difficulty reaching agreement on the circumstances in which a person can incur 
criminal responsibility for an omission. As a consequence, the entire provision was 
deleted from the Statute „with the understanding that the question of when and if 
omissions might constitute or be equivalent to conduct would have to be resolved in 
future by the Court.‟34  
                                                 
26
 Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 303, n. 38.  
27
 As suggested by Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 – Mental Element, supra note 5, at 859; Gerhard 
Werle and Florian Jessberger, „Unless Otherwise Provided‟ – Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the 
Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law, 3 JICJ 35 (2005) at 41; Albin Eser, 
Mental Elements, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2001) at 913.  
28
 Roger Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 303, n. 39.   
29
 Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 – Mental Element, supra note 5, at 859 
30
 United States v. Hilliard, 31 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1994). 
31
 See Michael Duttwiller, Liability for Omission in International Criminal Law, 6 ICLR 1 (2006) at 
56-58.    
32
 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
(Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During March-April and August 1996), U.N. GAOR 51st 
Sess., Supp. No. 22, UN Doc. A/51/22 (1996) Vol. I, p. 45, and Vol. II, at 90.  
33
 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. 
GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/CRP.7 (1998), pp. 64-65 (article) 28. 
34
 Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 – Mental Element, supra note 5, at 858-859. 
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Professor Albin Eser holds the view that conduct, as laid down in paragraph 2(a) of 
Article 30, is only limited to positive action. According to Eser, cases of omissions 
within the Statute are not covered by the default rule of Article 30 (intent and 
knowledge), „but would rather need special regulation according to the opening words 
of paragraph 1 (unless otherwise provided)‟.35 Other commentators noted that  
 
the very definitions of most of the crimes under the Rome Statute explicitly provide that 
they can be committed only by an act. Yet, there are some that can be said to provide 
room for such interpretation that encompasses omissions as well. Thus, such crime as 
wilful killing (article 8 para. 2(a)(i)) is capable of being interpreted in such way that 
includes faults of omission too. In that case it would cover, for instance, failure to feed 
prisoners of war or to provide medical care to wounded persons or to rescue 
shipwrecked persons belonging to a hostile armed forces.
36
  
 
A recent decision, rendered by the ICC PTC I expressly referred to Article 30 as 
covering acts or omissions.
37
 In addition, the practice of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
Tribunals is consistent that „committing‟, as set out in Articles 7(1)/6(1) of the 
ICTY/ICTR Statutes, respectively, „covers physically perpetrating a crime or 
engendering a culpable omission in violation of criminal law‟.38  
 
                                                 
35
 Eser, Mental Elements, supra note 27, at 912; See also Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 – Mental 
Element, supra note 5, at 859.  
36
 Gadirov and Clark, Article 9 – Elements of Crimes, supra note 5, at 515. 
37
 Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, paras. 351-355. In the present case, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I employed the phrase „omissions‟ eight times while discussing Article 30 of the 
ICC Statute.                                                                                                                                           
38
 Judgment, Limaj (IT-03-66-T), Trial Chamber, 30 November 2005, § 509 (emphasis added); 
Judgment, Krstić (IT-98-33-A), Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, § 188; Judgment, Kunarać (IT-96-
23-T & IT-9623/1-T), Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, § 390; Judgment, Gacumbitsi (ICTR-2001-
64-T, Trial Judgment, 17 June 2004, § 285 (“Committing” refers generally to the direct and physical 
perpetration of the crime by the offender himself”); Judgment, Kayishema (ICTR-95-1-A), Appeals 
Chamber, 1 June2001, § 187; Judgment, Vasiljević (IT-98-32-T), Trial Chamber, 29 Nov. 2002, § 62 
(„The Accused will only incur individual criminal responsibility for committing a crime under Article 
7(1) where is it is proved the he personally physically perpetrated the criminal acts in question or 
personally omitted to do something in violation of international humanitarian law‟); Judgment, 
Kamuhanda (ICTR-99-54A-T), Trial Chamber, § 595 („To commit a crime usually means to perpetrate 
or execute the crime by oneself or to omit to fulfil a legal obligation in a manner punishable by penal 
law.‟); See also Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, § 188; Judgment, 
Kunarac (IT-96-23-T & IT-9623/1-T), Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, § 390; Judgment, Krstić (IT-
98-33-T), Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, § 601; Judgment, Krnojelac (IT-97-25-T), Trial Chamber, 15 
March 2002,  § 73. Judgment, Blagoje Simić (IT-95-9-T) Trial Chamber, 17 October 2003, § 137 („Any 
finding of commission requires the personal or physical, direct or indirect, participation of the accused 
in the relevant criminal act, or a finding that the accused engendered a culpable omission to the same 
effect, where it is established that he had a duty to act, with requisite knowledge.‟). 
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Intent in Relation to Consequence – the First Alternative of Intent  
 
Pursuant to Article 30(2)(b) of the ICC Statute, a person has intent in relation to 
consequence if he (i) „means to cause that consequence‟ or (ii) „is aware that it will 
occur in the ordinary course of events.‟ Thus, Article 30(2)(b) assigned two different 
degrees of intent in relation to the consequence element, namely direct intent or dolus 
directus of first degree and indirect intent or dolus directus of second degree. The 
issue whether dolus eventualis or subjective recklessness is sufficient to fall within 
the ambit of Article 30 is highly debatable and is subject to a detailed examination 
below.  
These culpable mental states have to be assessed subjectively and not 
objectively, meaning that the prosecution must demonstrate that the perpetrator 
himself, and not a reasonable person in the same situation, was aware of the 
occurrence of the consequence in question. From a comparative criminal law 
perspective, the first degree of intent (direct intent/dolus directus of first degree) 
denotes the state of mind of a person who not only foresees but also wills the 
occurrence of a consequence. This is the actual meaning of intent in common law 
jurisdictions.  
 It is also equivalent to the Model Penal Code culpability term „purposely‟. 
Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code considers a person acts „purposely‟ with regard 
to a result if it is his conscious object to cause such result.
39
 In United States v. Bailey 
et al., the Supreme Court ruled that a „person who causes a particular result is said to 
act purposefully if he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that 
result happening from his conduct.‟40 Absicht, or dolus directus of first degree, in 
German criminal law, is also identical to „direct intent‟ as defined in Article 30(2)(b) 
of the ICC Statute. „Absicht‟ is defined as a „purpose bound will‟.41 In this type of 
intent, the actor‟s will is directed finally towards the accomplishment of that result.42  
                                                 
39
 Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(a)(i). 
40
 United States v. Bailey et al., 444 U.S. 394; 100 S. Ct. 624; 62 L. Ed. 2d 575; U.S. Lexis 69, 
November 7, 1979, Argued, January 21, 1980, Decided, at 632; See also United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978).  
41
 KREY, DEUTSCHES STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL, supra note 6, at 109.  
42
 Cramer, in STRAFGESETZBUCH: KOMMENTAR, (Schönke and Schröder eds., 1997) at 263. (Absicht ... 
liegt nur dann vor, wenn der Handlungswille des Täters final gerade auf den vom Gesetz bezeichneten 
Handlungserfolg gerichtet war); LACKNER, Strafgesetzbuch, (München: Beck, 1991) 95. For more 
details on Vorsatz in German criminal law in the English language see Mohamed Elewa Badar, Mens 
Rea – Mistake of Law and Mistake of Fact in German Criminal Law: A Survey for International 
Criminal Tribunals, 5 ICLR 203 (2005).  
 11 
In the Lubanga case,
43
 the first test ever of Article 30, PTC I of the ICC asserted that 
the reference to „intention‟ and „knowledge‟ in a conjunctive way requires the 
existence of a „volitional element‟ on the part of the suspect.44 This „volitional 
element‟ refers first to situations in which the suspect (i) knows that his acts or 
omissions will materialize the material elements of the crime at issue; and (ii) he 
undertakes these acts or omissions with the concrete intention to bring about the 
material elements of the crime. According to the PTC I, the above-mentioned 
scenario requires that the suspect possesses a level of intent which it called dolus 
directus of the first degree.
45
  
It is worth stressing that „direct intent‟, as defined in Article 30(2)(b) of the 
ICC Statute, is not identical to the „special intent‟ required for particular crimes which 
in their definitions include the following terms: „with intent to‟,46 „with the intent of 
affecting‟,47 and „with the intention of‟.48 The „special intent‟ or dolus specialis 
required for these categories of crimes has no material element (consequence or result 
element) to cover, since the accomplishment of this consequence is not an ingredient 
element of the crime at issue.
49
  
 
Intent in Relation to Consequence – the Second Alternative of Intent  
 
 
Article 30(2)(b) of the ICC Statute assigns a second alternative of intent with regard 
to the consequence element, providing that even if the perpetrator does not intend the 
proscribed result to occur, he is considered to intend that result if he „is aware that 
[the consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events‟. In the Lubanga case 
the PTC I asserted that Article 30 encompasses other aspects of dolus, namely dolus 
directus of the second degree.
50
 This type of dolus arises in situations in which the 
                                                 
43
 Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1.  
44
 Ibid., para. 351.   
45
 Ibid.  
46
 Rome Statute, Chapeau element of Article 6: „… genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy …‟   
47
 Rome Statute, Article 7(2)(f): „“Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman 
forcibly made pregnant, with intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population …‟   
48
 Rome Statute, Article 7(2)(h): „“Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or 
abduction … with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period 
of time.‟ 
49
 See Mohamed Elewa Badar, Drawing the Boundaries of Mens Rea in the Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 ICLR 313 (2006) at 317-328. 
50
 Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, para. 352.  
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suspect, without having the actual intent to bring about the material elements of the 
crime at issue, is aware that such elements will be the necessary outcome of his 
actions or omissions.
51
 Yet, there are three important aspects of this second 
alternative of intent.  
First, this degree of mens rea is akin to „knowledge‟ or „awareness‟ rather 
than „intent stricto sensu‟. This position is supported by the definition given to 
„knowledge‟ in paragraph 3 of Article 30, „[f]or the purpose of this article, 
“knowledge” means awareness that … a consequence will occur in the ordinary 
course of events.‟ The essence of the narrow distinction between acting intentionally 
and knowingly with regard to the consequence element is the presence or absence of a 
positive desire or purpose to cause that consequence. The plain meaning of Article 
30(2) makes it clear that once the prosecution demonstrates that an accused, in 
carrying out his conduct, was aware that the proscribed consequence will occur, 
unless extraordinary circumstances intervened, he is said to have intended that 
consequence. Thus, a soldier who aims to destroy a building, while not wishing to kill 
civilians whom he knows are in the building, is said to intend the killing of the 
civilians (Article 8(2)(a)(i) of the ICC Statute) if the building is in fact destroyed and 
the civilians are killed.
52
  
Secondly, the phrase „aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events‟ 
is subject to different interpretations. Does it require that the perpetrator foresees the 
occurrence of the consequence as certain? Or whether mere awareness of the probable 
occurrence of the consequence is sufficient? Professor Triffterer has suggested that 
since Article 30(2)(b) explicitly states „will occur‟ and not „might occur‟, it would not 
be enough to prove that the perpetrator is aware of the probability of the consequence 
and nevertheless carrying out the conduct which results in the proscribed 
consequence.
53
 Rather, the prosecution must demonstrate that the perpetrator foresees 
the consequence of his conduct as being certain unless extraordinary circumstances 
intervene.
54
 Interestingly, this second alternative of intent is identical to the Model 
Penal Code culpability term „knowingly‟. Pursuant to § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) of the Model 
                                                 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 As suggested by Werle and Jessberger, Unless Otherwise Provided, surpa note 27, at n. 34.  
53
 See Otto Triffterer, The New International Criminal Law – Its General Principles Establishing 
Individual Criminal Responsibility, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 639-727 (Kalliopi 
Koufa ed., 2003) at 706.   
54
 Eser, Mental Elements, supra note 27, at 915: “… the perpetrators being aware that the action will 
result in the prohibited consequence … with certainty…” 
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Penal Code, a person acts knowingly with respect to a result if it is not his conscious 
objective, yet he is practically certain that his conduct will cause that result.
55
  
It is also equivalent to the common law concept of „oblique intent‟, which 
extends the meaning of intention to encompass foresight of a certainty.
56
 Professor 
Glanville Williams, who devoted special attention to the notion of „oblique intention,‟ 
argued that the law should generally be the same where the defendant is aware that a 
consequence in the future is the certain result of what he does, though he does not 
intend or desire its occurrence.
57
 In cases of oblique intention, there are twin 
consequences of the conduct, x and y; the actor wants x and is prepared to accept its 
unwanted twin y.
58
 Oblique intent, in the words of Glanville Williams, is „a kind of 
knowledge or realization.‟59 In Regina v. Buzzanga and Durocher, a case concerned 
with promoting hatred against the French Canadian public in Essex County, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal adopted William‟s notion of „foresight of certainty‟ as a 
second alternative of intent: 
 
as a general rule, a person who foresees that a consequence is certain or substantially 
certain to result from an act which he does in order to achieve some other purpose, 
intends that consequence. The actor‟s foresight of the certainty or moral certainty of the 
consequence resulting from his conduct compels a conclusion that if he, none the less, 
acted so as to produce it, then he decided to bring it about (albeit regretfully) in order to 
achieve his ultimate purpose. His intention encompasses the means as well as to his 
ultimate objective.
60
 
 
It also resembles the German concept of dolus directus of the second degree in which 
the cognitive element (knowledge or awareness) dominates, whereas the volitional 
element is too weak. As the German Federal Supreme Court of Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof-BGH) put it more clearly, a perpetrator who foresees a 
consequence of his conduct as certain is considered to act wilfully with regard to this 
                                                 
55
 Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(b)(ii). 
56
 For a thorough analysis of the notion of „oblique intent‟ in the criminal law of England see Glanville 
Williams, Oblique Intention, 46 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL (1987) 417. 
57
 Ibid., at 420.  
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid.  
60
 Buzzanga (1979) 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (Ont.C.A), per Justice Martin, quoted in DON STUART, 
CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW: A TREATISE (2001) at 218-219. The relevant facts of the case as 
summarised by Stuart were as follows: The accused had been convicted … of wilfully promoting 
hatred against the French Canadian public in Essex County. They had circulated an inflammatory 
handbill entitled „Wake Up Canadians Your Future is At Stake‟. The two accused, who identified with 
French Canadian aspirations and culture, denied intent to promote hatred. They were involved with a 
movement to establish a French language high school in Essex County. Their purpose was to dramatise 
how ridiculous the opposition had been and to prompt the government into quick intervention.   
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consequence, even if he regrets its occurrence.
61
 Professor Albin Eser‟s thoughtful 
explanation as to the nature and meaning of the phrase „aware that it will occur in the 
ordinary course of events‟ merits lengthy quotation:   
 
Whatever may be meant by „ordinary course of events‟, with regard to the awareness thereof this 
clause is obviously meant to cover dolus directus in the second degree in which the volitional 
component of intention seems to be substituted by the cognitive component in terms of the perpetrators 
being aware that the action will result in the prohibited consequence (though not desired) with 
certainty, as in the case of bombing a building inhabited by members of a persecuted ethnical group 
where some of them will unavoidably be killed, with the further inevitable consequence of destroying 
parts of this group. If in this case the genocidal act is considered as „intentional‟ although the bomb 
planter may not have desired to kill any people or does not personally support the ethnical cleansing 
intentions of his superiors, this conclusion can be supported by attributional as well as evidentiary 
arguments: with regard to attributing consequences to the causer, it does not matter whether he was 
directly aiming at them or whether he, in pursuing a different goal, was prepared to let the prohibited 
result occur, thus using it as means to another end, as in the case where it is the military commander‟s 
first priority to destroy the building for strategic reasons while knowing with certainty that this goal 
could not be reached without killing innocent inhabitants. And from an evidentiary point of view, one 
could argue that, in acting though aware of the prohibited consequences, the perpetrator was indeed 
willing to accept them. This position is at least feasible so long as the perpetrator assumes that the 
prohibited consequences „will‟ occur, as required by sub-paragraph (b).62 
 
While some legal scholars view the second alternative of intent as excluding concepts 
of dolus eventualis or recklessness,
63
 others advocate the inclusion of recklessness 
and dolus eventualis in the legal standard of Article 30.
64
 As far as the drafting history 
                                                 
61
 BGHSt 21, 283 (vol. 21, at 283).  
62
 Eser, Mental Elements, supra note 27, at 914-915.  
63
 Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 
EJIL 158 (1999), at 153: „While it is no doubt meritorious to have defined these two notions [intent and 
knowledge in Article 30], it appears questionable to have excluded recklessness as a culpable mens rea 
under the Statute.‟; Johan D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of 
Mens Rea in International Criminal Law, 12 MIAMI INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 
57-149 (2004), at 64-5: „Antonio Cassese has criticized the ICC Statute for not recognizing 
“recklessness” as the basis of liability for war crimes. However, if one takes into account the resolve to 
confine the jurisdiction of the ICC to “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole,” it is reasonable to accept that crimes committed without the highest degree of 
dolus ought as a general rule not to be prosecuted in the ICC.‟; Werle and Jessberger, Unless Otherwise 
Provided, supra note 27, at 41-42: „This interpretation of Article 30(2)(b) and 3 ICCSt., which appears 
to be shared by most commentators, results in the establishment of a standard of mens rea apparently 
stricter than that usually applied by both domestic and international courts.‟ 
64
 Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 – Mental Element, supra note 5, at 533-4; Hans H. H. Jescheck, 
The General Principles of International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC 
Statute, 2 JICJ 38-55 (2004), at 45. Ferrando Mantovani, The General Principles of International 
Criminal Law: The Viewpoint of a National Criminal Lawyer, 1 JICJ 26-38 (2003), at 32: „… the ICC 
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is concerned, Professor Roger Clark noted that „dolus eventualis fell out of the written 
discourse before Rome. Recklessness, in the sense of subjectively taking a risk to 
which the actor‟s mind has been directed, was ultimately to vanish also from the 
Statute at Rome, with again only an implicit decision as to whether it was appropriate 
for assessing responsibility.‟65 Before going further to examine whether recklessness 
and dolus eventualis fall under the realm of Article 30 of the ICC Statute it is 
desirable to discuss the meaning of these concepts under common and civil legal 
systems.  
  
Recklessness in Common Law Systems  
 
The law of England, as it currently stands, defines recklessness as the conscious 
taking of an unjustifiable risk. The term „recklessly‟ is used to denote the subjective 
sate of mind of a person who foresees that his conduct may cause the prohibited result 
but nevertheless takes a deliberate and unjustifiable risk of bringing it about.
66
 A 
modern Canadian writer, Don Stuart, asserted that the proper test to be followed in 
such situations is to examine whether D, given his shortcomings and strengths, 
foresaw the consequence or circumstance. He concluded that whether D „ought‟, 
„could‟ or „should‟ – as a reasonable person – have thought about the occurrence of 
the consequence or the existence of such circumstances is not the right test to be 
applied.
67
 In Sansregret v. The Queen,
68
 a case before the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the subjective approach for recklessness was authoritatively asserted as follows: 
 
In accordance with well established principles for the determination of criminal 
liability, recklessness, to form a part of the criminal mens rea, must have an element of 
the subjective. It is found in the attitude of one who, aware that there is a danger that 
his conduct could bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, nevertheless 
persists, despite the risk. It is in other words, the conduct of one who sees the risk and 
                                                                                                                                            
Statute‟s provision on the mental element (Article 30) appears to limit itself to intent (dolus) alone, 
thereby excluding negligence (culpa). Using ambiguous and psychologically imprecise wording … It 
… does include intent and recklessness (dolus eventualis) …‟; Werle and Jessberger, „Unless 
Otherwise Provided‟, supra note 27, at 53: „the requirments of the perpetrator‟s being aware that the 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events or of the perpetrator‟s meaning to cause that 
consequence (Article 30(2)(b) ICCSt.) excludes both forms of subjective accountability. It thus follows 
from the wording of Article 30(2)(b) that recklessness and dolus eventualis do not meet the 
requirement.‟   
65
 Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 301.  
66
 See R. v. G and Another [2004] 1 AC 1034 (HL). 
67
 DON STUART, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW, A TREATISE, supra note 60, at 224. 
68
 Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 45 C.R. (3d) 193, 203-04 (S.C.C.)  
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who take the chance. It is in this sense that the term „recklessness‟ is used in the 
criminal law and it is clearly distinct from the concept of civil negligence.
69
 
 
The term recklessness, as used in the Model Penal Code, involves conscious risk 
creation, an element which differentiates it from acting either purposely or 
knowingly. It is a state of mind distinct from intent.
70
 The Code provides that a 
person acts „recklessly‟ if (1) he „consciously disregards a substantial and unjustified 
risk that the material element exits or will result from his conduct.‟71 According to the 
Code, a risk is „substantial and unjustifiable‟ if „considering the nature and purpose of 
the actor‟s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe 
in the actor‟s situation.‟72 In United States v. Albers,73 it was held that a finding of 
recklessness may only be made when persons disregard a risk of harm of which they 
are aware.
74
 The requirement that the actor consciously disregard the risk is the most 
significant part of the definition of recklessness. It is this concept which differentiates 
a reckless actor from a negligent one.
75
  
 
Dolus Eventualis in Romano-Germanic Law Systems 
 
Dolus eventualis is a well known concept in most of the Romano-Germanic legal 
systems. This type of dolus is recognized under the Italian criminal law as dolo 
eventuale. Pursuant to Article 43 of the Italian Codice Penale, all serious crimes 
require proof of the mental element known as dolo, which means that the prohibited 
result must be both preveduto (foreseen) and voluto (wanted/willed). According to the 
Italian criminal law, a result may be voluto even though it is not desired, if, having 
contemplated the possibility of bringing it about by pursuing a course of conduct, the 
perpetrator is prepared to run the risk of doing so dolo eventuale. Even a small risk 
                                                 
69
 Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 45 C.R. (3d) 193, 203-04 (S.C.C.)  
70
 U.S. v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146.  
71
 Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(c). 
72
 Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(c). 
73
 United States v. Albers, 226 F. 3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2000). 
74
 United States. v. Albers, 226 F. 3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2000), citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
836-37 (1994) (emphasis added); see also United States. v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
75
 David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 281 (1981), at 351. 
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may be voluto if the accused has reconciled himself to, or accepted it as a part of the 
price he was prepared to pay to secure his objective.
76
  
Dolus eventualis (bedingter Vorsatz) and especially its element of will are still 
a matter of dispute in German legal system. On the one hand, case law concerning this 
element is inconsistent. On the other hand, a considerable number of German legal 
scholars contend that dolus eventualis requires only an intellectual element, which 
most of them define as foresight of „concrete possibility‟.77 German literature, as well 
as courts, treated dolus eventualis differently according to different theories on the 
subject. The following will examine the “consent and approval theory”. This theory is 
applied by German courts,
78
 and is usually referred to as the „theory on consent and 
approval‟ (Einwilligungs - und Billigungstheorie).79 The majority of German legal 
scholars who ascribe to this theory use a slightly different definition for dolus 
eventualis. They are of the opinion that the offender must „seriously consider‟ 
(ernstnehmen) the result‟s occurrence and must accept the fact that his conduct could 
fulfil the legal elements of the offence.
80
 Another way of putting the point is to say the 
offender must „reconcile himself‟ (sich abfinden) to the prohibited result.81  
This theory was implicitly adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Stakić case.82 In establishing the requisite mens 
rea for the crime of murder as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War under 
Article 3 of the ICTY, the Yugoslavia Tribunal had the following understanding 
regarding the technical definition of dolus eventualis: „if the actor engages in life-
endangering behaviour, his killing becomes intentional if he “reconciles himself” or 
“makes peace” with the likelihood of death.‟83 If, to the contrary, the offender is 
„confident‟ (vertrauen) and has reason to believe that the result – though he foresees it 
as a possibility – will not occur, he lacks dolus eventualis and acts only negligently.84  
                                                 
76
 See FINBARR MCAULEY AND J. PAUL MCCUTCHEON, CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2000) 301-303. 
77
 Heribert Schumann, Criminal Law, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW, (Werner F. Ebke and 
Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996), at 389-390.   
78
 BGHSt 36, 1; 44, 99; BGH NStZ (Neue Zeitschrift fuer Strafrecht) 1999, p. 507; BGH NStZ 2000, 
583.  
79
 JOHANNES WESSELS AND WERNER BEULKE, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 76 (2002).  
80
 CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL, 376 (1997).  
81
 Ibid. 
82
 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003 (Stakić Trial 
Judgment), para. 587. 
83
 Ibid.    
84
 Ibid. 
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In principle, and in order to avoid any uncertainties or ambiguities which may 
shadow the present discussion, we have to concede that dolus eventualis, like other 
types of dolus, namely dolus directus and dolus indirectus, should include the two 
components of intent: knowledge and wilfulness. Thus, if one of these components is 
missing, dolus eventualis no longer exists on the part of the perpetrator.
85
  
 
Dolus Eventualis, Recklessness and the Lubanga Decision 
 
As already mentioned, in the Lubanga case, PTC I of the ICC asserted that the 
reference to „intention‟ and „knowledge‟ in a conjunctive way, as set out in Article 30, 
requires the existence of a „volitional element‟ on the part of the suspect.86 Aware that 
the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc Tribunals has recognised other degrees of 
culpable mental states than that of direct intent (dolus directus of the first degree) and 
indirect intent (dolus directus of the second degree),
87
 the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
went further, assuring that the volitional element  mentioned above also encompasses 
other aspects of dolus, namely dolus eventualis.
88
 According to the Pre-Trial Chamber 
dolus eventualis applies in situations in which the suspect „(a) is aware of the risk that 
the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, 
and (b) accepts such an outcome by reconciling himself or herself with it or 
consenting to it.‟89 The Pre-Trial Chamber found it necessary to distinguish between 
two types of scenarios regarding the degree of probability of the occurrence of the 
consequence from which intent can be inferred:  
 
Firstly, if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is substantial (that is, there is a 
likelihood that it “will occur in the ordinary course of events”), the fact that the suspect accepts the 
idea of bringing about the objective elements of the crime can be inferred from:  
   (i) the awareness by the suspect of the substantial likelihood that his or her actions or omissions 
would result in the realisation of the objective elements of the crime; and 
   (ii) the decision by the suspect to carry out his or her actions or omissions despite such awareness.  
                                                 
85
 The perpetrator could still be held criminally responsible and liable for being consciously negligent.  
86
 Ibid., para. 351.   
87
 Elewa Badar, Drawing the Boundaries of Mens Rea, supra note 49, at 313. 
88
 Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, para. 352.  
89
 Ibid., para. 352 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). 
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Secondly, if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is low, the suspect must 
have clearly or expressly accepted the idea that such objective elements may result from his or her 
actions or omissions.
90
 
 
However, in situations where the suspect‟s mental state „falls short of accepting that 
the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, 
such a state of mind cannot qualify as a truly intentional realisation of the objective 
elements, and hence would not meet the “intent and knowledge” requirement 
embodied in article 30 of the Statute.‟91    
There are two important aspects of the PTC‟s clarification regarding the mens 
rea contours as set out in Article 30 of the ICC Statute. First, it appears that the 
Chamber adhered to the Romano-Germanic concept of intent which consists of two 
components, namely, Wissen and Wollen (Germany), preveduto and voluto (Italy), or 
la conscience and la volonté (France).
92
  
Second, by requiring the existence of a volitional element on the part of the 
accused – in the sense of accepting the consequence – the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
accepted the civil law concept of dolus eventualis and ruled out the common law 
recklessness, as the latter falls short of meeting the mens rea threshold as set out in 
Article 30.
93
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 Ibid., paras. 353-354. 
91
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The Lubanga PTC I provided further clarification as to the reason of ruling out the 
notion of recklessness from the realm of Article 30 of the ICC Statute:   
 
The concept of recklessness requires only that the perpetrator be aware of the existence of a risk that 
the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, but does not 
require that he or she reconcile himself or herself with the result. In so far as recklessness does not 
require the suspect to reconcile himself or herself with the causation of the objective elements of the 
crime as a result of his or her actions or omissions, it is not part of the concept of intention.
94
 
 
It is significant in this regard to recall Professor Antonio Cassese‟s concerns, almost 
eight years prior to the Lubanga decision, regarding the exclusion of the notion of 
recklessness by the drafters of the Rome Statute:  
 
While it is no doubt meritorious to have defined these two notions [intent and knowledge in Article 
30], it appears questionable to have excluded recklessness as a culpable mens rea under the Statute. 
One fails to see why, at least in the case of war crimes, this last mental element may not suffice for 
criminal responsibility to arise. Admittedly, in the case of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
aggression, the extreme gravity of the offence presuppose that it may only be perpetrated when intent 
and knowledge are present. However, for less serious crimes, such as war crimes, current international 
law must be taken to allow for recklessness: for example, it is admissible to convict a person who, 
when shelling a town, takes a high an unjustifiable risk that civilian will be killed – without, however, 
intending, that they be killed – with the result that the civilians are, in fact, thereby killed.95  
 
Cassese continued his criticism regarding the exclusion of recklessness as a culpable 
mental element under the Rome Statute in the following words: 
 
Hence, on this score the Rome Statute marks a step backwards with respect to lex lata, and possibly 
creates a loophole: persons responsible for war crimes, when they acted recklessly, may be brought to 
trial and convicted before national courts, while they would be acquitted by the ICC. It would seem 
that the draughtsmen have unduly expanded the shield they intended to provide to the military.
96
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
he could have said to himself: It may be either so or different, it may happen either so or differently; 
anyhow I shall act.) For a different opinion see Paul T. Smith, Recklessness in Dolus Eventualis, 96 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL 81 (1979): (criticizing South African law to the extent that it interprets 
dolus eventualis as indifference rather than foresight). 
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 Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, note 2 above, fn. 438. 
95
 Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 63, at 153-154.   
96
 Ibid., at 154.  
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However, it would be a profound mistake to draw from Cassese‟s hypothetical 
example that those persons will escape justice by claiming that their main aim was 
merely shelling a military objective and that they lack any intention regarding the 
killing of civilians. In such situations, those actors can incur criminal responsibility 
under the concept of dolus eventualis if the prosecution succeeds in demonstrating  
that in shelling the towns, it was probable that those civilians would be killed and that 
the actors accept such a result. Triffterer, for instance, has argued that the concepts of 
recklessness and dolus eventualis can be read within the text of Article 30 since the 
phrase „will occur‟ as provided for in Article 30 of the ICC Statute may be interpreted 
to encompass situations in which „the perpetrator is aware that a consequence might 
occur and nevertheless engages in taking action tending in that direction, thereby 
accepting its consequences‟.97 Kai Ambos disagrees:    
 
Certainly, reckless conduct cannot be the basis of responsibility since a corresponding provision was 
deleted. The same applies for the higher threshold of dolus eventualis: this is a kind of “conditional 
intent” by which a wide range of subjective attitudes towards the result are expressed and, thus, implies 
a higher threshold than recklessness. The perpetrator may be indifferent to the result or be “reconciled” 
with the harm as a possible cost of attaining his or her goal… However, [in such situations of dolus 
eventualis] the perpetrator is not, as required by Article 30(2)(b), aware that a certain result or 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. He or she only thinks that the result is 
possible. Thus, the wording of Article 30 hardly leaves room for an interpretation which includes dolus 
eventualis within the concept of intent as a kind of “indirect intent.”98 
 
The exclusion of recklessness as a culpable mental element within the meaning of 
Article 30 runs in harmony with the basic principles of Islamic law (Shari’a) that no 
one shall be held criminal responsible for hudud crimes (offences with fixed 
mandatory punishments) or qisās crimes (retaliation) unless he or she has wilfully or 
intentionally (‘amdān) committed the crime at issue.99     
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 Triffterer, „The New International Criminal Law‟, supra note 53, at 706.  
98
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The Meaning of Knowledge 
 
Paragraph three of Article 30 provides two definitions of knowledge. The first applies 
to consequences, whereas the second pertains to attendant circumstances. Under the 
ICC Statute, the distinction between acting „intentionally‟ and „knowingly‟ is very 
narrow. Knowledge that a consequence „will occur in the ordinary course of events‟ is 
a common element in both conceptions.‟100 A result is „knowingly‟ caused if the actor 
is aware that „a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events‟.101 With 
„attendant circumstances‟, one acts „knowingly‟ if he is aware „that a circumstance 
exists‟.102  
                                                 
100
 Compare Rome Statute, Article 30 (2) (b) and Article 30 (3).  
101
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102
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Knowledge in Relation to the Circumstance Element 
 
Logically speaking, there is no offence which requires the prosecution to prove that 
the accused, in the true sense, intends a particular circumstance to exist at the time he 
carries out his conduct. If the accused intends a circumstance to exist, it means that he 
hopes it exists or will exist. According to the ICC Statute, knowledge as to the 
circumstance element arises in various situations. It can relate to circumstances 
forming part of the definition of the crime, i.e. the requirement of knowledge of the 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population as provided 
for in the chapeau element of Article 7.
103
 The same can be said regarding the crime 
of rape, punishable as a crime against humanity
104
 or as a war crime,
105
 where the 
non-consent of the victim and the perpetrator‟s knowledge thereof is considered as 
constitutive element of the offence.
106
 The wording of Article 30 makes it clear that 
„knowingly‟ refers to the actor‟s subjective state of mind and not the state of mind of 
a reasonable person.  
Additionally, in defining „knowledge‟ to mean the perpetrator‟s „awareness 
that a circumstance exists‟, Article 30(3) limits the meaning of knowledge to „actual 
knowledge‟ as opposed to „constructive knowledge‟. Even knowledge of „high 
probability‟ of the existence of a particular fact does not pass Article 30‟s culpability 
test.
107
 There is reason to question whether the doctrine of „wilful blindness‟ or 
„wilfully shutting one‟s eyes to the obvious‟ satisfies the mens rea threshold of 
Article 30(3). The answer can be in the affirmative if the doctrine is understood to 
apply only in situations where the perpetrator is virtually certain that the fact exists, 
or, as stated by Glanville Williams:  
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A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually 
knew. He suspected the fact; he realized its probability; but he refrained from obtaining the final 
confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowledge. This and this alone, is 
wilful blindness.
108
  
 
Any attempts to stretch the wilful blindness doctrine by accepting some lesser degree 
of knowledge instead of actual knowledge would blur the distinction between wilful 
blindness and recklessness. There are, however, exceptions to the application of the 
„actual knowledge‟ standard with regard to the factual elements of particular crime. 
The Elements of Crimes of the „war crime of using, conscripting or enlisting children‟ 
under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces, or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities,
109
 allow for a lower level of knowledge than that of 
„actual knowledge‟.110 According to paragraph three of the Elements of Article 
8(2)(b)(xxvi) the perpetrator can incur criminal responsibility if he „knew‟ or „should 
have known‟ that the child concerned was under the age of 15. Thus, the Elements of 
Crimes made it clear that „constructive knowledge‟ is a sufficient mens rea standard 
with regard to the circumstance element of this crime. As a consequence, this crime 
falls into the realm of „negligence crimes‟ where conviction depends upon proof that 
the perpetrator had „reasonable cause‟ to believe or suspect some relevant fact, in the 
present case, that the child concerned was under the age of 15.  
The vital point is that constructive knowledge differs from the two other 
degrees of knowledge, namely, actual knowledge and wilful blindness, in requiring 
neither awareness nor purposive avoidance of the means of learning the truth. 
Another way of putting the point is to say that the perpetrator may incur criminal 
liability for being negligent with regard to a circumstance when, as reasonable person, 
he ought to know that such „circumstance exists or will exist and fails to do so, 
whether he has given thought to the question or not.‟111  
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Another example of lowering the actual knowledge standard to reach the one of 
constructive knowledge appears at the third paragraph of the Elements of the “war 
crimes of improper use of a flag of truce”112 and the “war crime of improper use of a 
flag, insignia or uniform of the hostile party”.113 According to the third paragraph 
common to both provisions, it is sufficient to hold the perpetrator criminally liable if 
he „knew or should have known of the prohibited nature of such use.‟114 The term 
„prohibited nature‟ denotes the illegality of the conduct.  
It is obvious that such a negligence standard is inconsistent with the mens rea  
threshold as set out in Article 30 of the Rome Statute – that all the materials elements 
of a crime be committed with intent and knowledge.   
 
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE 30 AND OTHER PROVISIONS 
OF THE ICC STATUTE  
 
 
Article 30 vis-à-vis the Culpability Requirements stated in an Offence Definition  
 
As noted by Professor Schabas, several crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the ICC have their „own built-in mens rea requirement.‟115 The crime of genocide, 
punishable under Article 6 of the ICC Statute, is defined as a proscribed act 
committed „with intent to destroy‟ a protected group.116 The chapeau element of 
crimes against humanity requires a subjective element of knowledge that the attack 
was carried out in a widespread or systematic manner against a civilian population.
117
 
Extermination, a crime against humanity, „includes the intentional infliction of 
conditions of life … calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population.‟118 Several war crimes punishable as grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, or serious violations of the laws and customs of war under Article 8 of 
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the ICC Statute, have their own built-in mens rea such as the adjectives „wilful‟, 
„wilfully‟, „wantonly‟, „intentionally‟, or „treacherously‟.119  
The first question which arises is whether the mens rea threshold of Article 30 
would automatically apply to cover the material elements of such offences, even if the 
crime at issue contains in its language a mental element. The second question is an 
outcome of the first. If the crime at issue required a lower or a higher threshold than 
the one provided for in Article 30, which threshold should then prevail? In other 
words, does Article 30 allow a departure from the mens rea standard laid down in it? 
Another difficulty appears in applying the rule of „mens rea coverage‟ on particular 
crimes which requires a proof of „special intent‟ (e.g. the intent to destroy a group in 
the crime of genocide). In such type of offence, this „ulterior intent‟ has no material 
element to cover, since the actual destruction of a group is not an ingredient element 
of the offence.  
„Unless otherwise provided‟, a proviso which is set out in the very beginning 
of the first paragraph of Article 30, appears to come as the Prince who redeems 
Cinderella from her poor circumstances. According to this proviso, ICC judges have 
to consider Article 30 as a default rule that is applied to all crimes and modes of 
participation in criminal conduct, so long as there are no specific rules on the mental 
element expressly stated in these provisions,
120
 and hence paving the road to the 
application of the lex specialis principle. Donald Piragoff, who was the first to 
comment on Article 30, has a different opinion regarding the relationship between 
Article 30 and particular crimes which requires that the material elements be 
„intentional‟ or be committed „intentionally‟. He noted that given the general rule in 
Article 30, the inclusion of these adjectives in the definition of particular crimes „is 
likely unnecessary surplusage‟.121 He pointed out that „[t]he specific presence of these 
terms is likely a product of the negotiations process whereby certain delegations 
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wished to make clear the intentional nature of the crimes before they agreed to their 
inclusion in article 7 and 8.‟122 It was said that the only significance of Article 30 to 
these provisions is that it imports the element of knowledge into those definitions of 
crimes.
123
  
But the subjective elements included in the definition of the crime against 
humanity of extermination are not mere redundant. Article 7(2)(b) of the ICC Statute 
defines extermination to include „the intentional infliction of conditions of life … 
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.‟ The term 
„calculated‟ as it appears in Article 7(2)(b) can be interpreted as requiring a higher 
threshold of mens rea than that provided for in the default rule of Article 30. It can be 
interpreted as requiring an element of premeditation, a subjective mental state which 
requires that the accused, at a minimum, held a deliberate plan to exterminate prior to 
the act causing the destruction of part of a population, rather than forming the 
intention simultaneously with the act. (Roger‟s Comments – the drafting history).  
By including the „unless otherwise provided‟ in the provision of Article 30, the 
codifiers of the ICC Statute have achieved several goals. On the one hand, Article 30, 
for the first time in the sphere of international criminal law, sets a general requirement 
for international criminal liability which is based on intent and knowledge. On the 
other hand, „unless otherwise provided‟ enables the Statute to absorb the 
corresponding rules of international humanitarian law (the definition of war crimes 
under Article 8) without having to modify the definitions of these crimes . It also 
enables the Statute to adopt verbatim the definition of the crime of genocide, as 
defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention, without having to change any of its 
subjective elements.  
 
Article 30 vis-à-vis the Elements of Crimes 
 
Article 30 of the ICC Statute has to be read together with several provisions set out in 
the ICC Statute. Article 21, which constitutes the first codification of the sources of 
international criminal law, establishes a hierarchy of applicable law to be applied by 
judges of the International Criminal Court.
124
 According to Article 21(1)(a) of the ICC 
Statute, the Court shall apply in the first place (i) its Statute, (ii) Elements of Crimes 
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and (iii) its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
125
  
It is worth stressing that the general introduction to the Elements of Crimes
126
 
which consists of ten paragraphs has a great significance on the interpretation and the 
application of Article 30. Paragraph one of the general introduction reiterates the 
provision laid down in Article 9(1) of the ICC Statute and reassures that the Elements 
of Crimes  „shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, 
and 8.‟  
Paragraph 2 states that „where no reference is made in the Elements of Crimes 
to a mental element for any particular conduct, consequence or circumstance listed, it 
is understood that the relevant mental element, i.e. intent, knowledge, or both, set out 
in Article 30, applies. Exceptions to the Article 30 standard, based on the Statute, 
including applicable law under its relevant provisions, are indicated below.‟  
 According to paragraph 3, „existence of intent and knowledge can be inferred 
from relevant facts and circumstances.‟ Paragraph 4 provides that „with respect to 
mental elements associated with elements involving value judgment, such as those 
using the terms “inhumane” or “severe”, it is not necessary that the perpetrator 
personally completed a particular value judgment, unless otherwise indicated‟. 
 Paragraph 2 of the general introduction will come into play in situations where 
the Elements of Crimes for particular crimes, provide for a lower threshold of mens 
rea (negligence standard) than that of Article 30. For instance, while Article 30(3) of 
the ICC Statute assigns a knowledge standard with regard to the circumstance element 
of the crime of genocide by „forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group‟ (the age of the victim concerned),127 the Elements of Crimes introduce a 
negligence standard (should have known) with regard to the same circumstance 
element of this offence. Addressing this point Professor Claus Kress had this to say:  
 
It is impossible to reconcile this standard [negligence] with Article 30(1) [intent and knowledge] of the 
ICC Statute so that the question arises as to whether the deviation can be justified on the basis of the 
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words “unless otherwise provided” in Article 30(1) of the ICC Statute. As there is no “colourable 
support” for the deviation in prior case law the answer would appear to depend on whether the ICC 
Elements of Crimes can by themselves “provide otherwise”. It is submitted that they cannot, though a 
sentence in the Elements‟ “General introduction” may be read to suggest the contrary.128  
 
In Lubanga, the PTC I affirmed that the ICC Elements of Crimes can by themselves 
„provide otherwise‟.129 Lubanga was charged with conscripting and enlisting children 
under the age of fifteen years into armed forces, and using them to participate actively 
in hostilities, a crime punishable  under articles 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) and 8 (2) (e) (vii) of 
the Statute. The third element of the Elements of Crimes assigns a negligent standard 
(should have known) with regard to the circumstance element (the age of the victim 
concerned) of these offences.
130
 Relying on the “unless otherwise provided” clause, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber considered this element of negligence, as set out in the 
Elements of Crimes of the above mentioned provisions, an exception to the „intent 
and knowledge‟ standard provided in Article 30(1).131 
As for the fifth element of the Elements of the Crimes for the crime under 
consideration, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that this „Element‟ requires only that „the 
perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an 
armed conflict‟, without going as far as to require that the accused conclude, on the 
basis of a legal assessment of the said circumstances, that there was an armed 
conflict.‟132 The same applies mutatis mutandis to the crime of genocide by forcibly 
transferring children. It would be sufficient to demonstrate that the perpetrator was 
negligent regarding the circumstance element, namely the fact that the victims 
forcibly transferred were under the age of 18 years.
133
  
                                                 
128
 Claus Kress, The Crime of Genocide under International Law, 6 ICLR 461 (2006) at 485 (emphasis 
in original, footnotes omitted). 
129
 Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, para. 356. 
130
 Ibid., para. 358. The Pre-Trial Chamber I observed that: „The “should have known” requirement set 
forth in the Elements of Crimes – which is to be distinguished from the “must have known” or 
constructive knowledge requirement – falls within the concept of negligence because it is met when the 
suspect: i. did not know that the victims were under the age of fifteen years at the time they were 
enlisted, conscripted or used to participate actively in hostilities; and ii. lacked such knowledge because 
he or she did not act with due diligence in the relevant circumstances one can only say that the suspect” 
should have known” if his or her lack of knowledge results from his or her failure to comply with his or 
her duty to act with due diligence).‟ 
131
 Ibid., paras. 356-359. 
132
 Ibid., para. 360. 
133
 See the sixth element of the Elements of Crimes of Article 6(e) Genocide by forcibly transferring 
children. For more information on this specific crime see Kurt Mundorff, 2008, Working Paper: Other 
Peoples’ Children: A Textual and Contextual Interpretation of the Genocide Convention, Article 2(e), 
 30 
One might wonder whether such a lower standard of culpability (negligence) is 
sufficient for crimes that have a very specific object. “Forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group”, “using, conscripting or enlisting children into armed 
forces” and “compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of a hostile power” 
are crimes, the very definition of which explicitly state the object against which 
certain acts are directed (i.e. children and prisoners of war).
134
 One might suggest that 
in such categories of crimes which have a very specific object, knowledge, as opposed 
to mere negligence, has to be assigned to the circumstance element. There is no 
provision at the Rome Statute which obliges the honourable judges of the ICC to 
apply the Elements of Crimes. The plain text of Article 9 states that these Elements of 
Crimes „shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, and 
8.‟ However, the application of these Elements might infringe one of the most 
fundamental rights of the accused, namely, the presumption of innocence. It is up to 
honourable judges of the ICC to decide on that issue and not to adhere to approach 
adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case.     
Furthermore, the Elements of Crimes includes the following „alien element‟ as 
an element of the crime of genocide: „[t]he conduct took place in the context of a 
manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that 
could itself effect such destruction.‟135 If one considers this element as a 
„circumstance element‟, it has to be covered by the default rule of Article 30 of the 
ICC Statute and, as consequence, the prosecution must prove that the perpetrator is 
aware that his proscribed conduct (i.e. of killing members of the group) „took place in 
the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was 
conduct that could itself effect such destruction.‟136 
   
Article 30 vis-à-vis Individual Criminal Responsibility – Article 25  
 
Article 25 of the ICC Statute which is entitled „individual criminal responsibility‟ 
provides for various forms of perpetration and participation in a criminal conduct. 
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Sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 3 refers to three forms of perpetration. Yet, under the 
ICC Statute a person shall incur criminal responsibility if he or she commits any of 
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC „whether as (i) an individual, (ii) jointly 
with another, or (iii) through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible‟.137  
From a German criminal law perspective, element (i) speaks about 
unmittelbarer Täter (the direct perpetrator who physically carried out the material 
elements of the offence in person); element (ii) deals with Mittäterschaft (co-
perpetration); and the third form of perpetration is concerned with mittelbarer Täter 
or Hintermann (indirect perpetrator, a person who acts through the agency of 
another). This latter form of perpetration was defined by the 1996 Preparatory 
Committee in the following words, „[a] person shall be deemed to be a principal 
where that person commits the crime through an innocent agent who is not aware of 
the criminal nature of the act committed, such as a minor, a person of defective mental 
capacity or person acting under mistake of fact or otherwise acting without mens 
rea.‟138 
 
Co-perpetratorship 
  
The first test of the notion of co-perpetratorship as provided for in Article 25(3)(a) of 
the ICC Statute was made by Pre-Trial Chamber 1, in the Lubanga case.
139
 There the 
Chamber agreed with scholarly opinions that the concept of co-perpetration  
 
is originally rooted in the idea that when the sum of the co-ordinated individual contributions of a 
plurality of persons results in the realisation of all the objective elements of a crime, any person making 
a contribution can be held vicariously responsible for the contributions of all the others and, as a result, 
can be considered as a principal to whole crime.
140
 
 
The Chamber noted that „the definitional criterion of the concept of co-perpetration is 
linked to the distinguishing between principles and accessories to a crime where a 
criminal offence is committed by a plurality of persons.‟141 The Chamber realised that 
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there are three different approaches to differentiate between principals and accessories 
to a crime, namely, (1) the objective approach (only those who physically carry out  
one or more of the objective elements of the offence can be considered principles to 
the crime);
142
 (2) the subjective approach adopted by the two ad hoc Tribunals 
through the concept of joint criminal enterprise places the focus on the state of mind 
in which the contribution to the crime was made; 
143
 and (3) the third approach – the 
one adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber for distinguishing between principals and 
accessories – is the concept of „control over the crime‟.144  
According to the Pre-Trial Chamber „this approach involves an objective 
element, consisting of the appropriate factual circumstances for exercising control 
over the crime, and a subjective element, consisting of the awareness of such 
circumstances.‟145 The Chamber asserted that the main feature of this concept is that 
„principals to a crime are not limited to those who physically carry out the objective 
element of the offence, but also include those, who, in spite of being … [remote] from 
the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because they decide 
whether and how the offence will committed.‟146 They are principals and not 
accomplices because they have, along with others, control over the offence by reason 
of essential tasks assigned to them.
147
  
From a German criminal law perspective, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber adhered 
to the notion of Mittäterschaft (co-perpetration) based on funktionelle Tatherrschaft 
(functional control over the crime). The Chamber, however, deviated from Professor 
Roxin‟s theory which restricted the notion of co-perpetration based on functional 
control over the crime for those who contribute to the commission of the crime at its 
execution stage.
148
 According to the Chamber, those who contribute at the preparatory 
stage as well as at the execution stage fall within the ambit of co-perpetration as set 
out in Article 25(a) of the ICC Statute as long as the following objective and 
subjective elements are met: 
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(i) the existence of an agreement or common plan between two or more persons 
(objective element);
149
 
(ii) co-ordinated essential contribution by each co-perpetrator resulting in the 
realisation of the objective elements of the crime (objective element);
150
 
(iii) the fulfilment of the subjective element of the crime in question by the co-
perpetrators including any requisite dolus specialis or ulterior intent for the type 
of crime involved;
151
  
(iv) the co-perpetrators must all be mutually aware and mutually accept that 
implementing their common plan may result in the realisation of the objective 
elements of the crime; 
(v) the co-perpetrator must be aware of the factual circumstances enabling him to 
jointly control the crime.
152
 
 
As far as the subjective elements are concerned, element (iii) can be satisfied if the 
co-perpetrator acted with any of the following mental states  dolus directus of the first 
degree, dolus directus of the second degree, or dolus eventualis. These mens rea 
standards – as already discussed above – satisfy the threshold of the mental element 
embodied in Article 30 of the ICC Statute. However, in situations where the definition 
of the crime requires a specific intent, such as the case of persecution as a crime 
against humanity or genocide, the prosecution has to demonstrate that each co-
perpetrator possesses such a specific intent.
153
   
Element (iv) requires proof of „double intent‟ on the part of the co-
perpetrators, namely, a „cognitive component‟ and a „volitional component‟. As for 
the former, it must be proved that all co-perpetrators at the time they agreed to start 
the implementation of their common plan were mutually aware of the risk that such 
implementation may result in the realisation of the objective elements of the crime.
154
 
As for the volitional component, it has to be proved that all co-perpetrators „mutually 
accept[ed] such a result by reconciling themselves with it or consenting to it.‟155  
The requirement of such a subjective element for the notion of co-perpetration 
based on joint control over the crime will inevitably stands against the application of 
any lower threshold than that of dolus eventualis. That is to say the negligence 
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standard (should have known) assigned to the circumstance element (the age of the 
victim concerned) of the war crime of enlisting or conscripting children will not be 
applicable in the instant case.
156
 
Element (v) is the third and last subjective element required for the notion of 
co-perpetration based on joint control of the crime. According to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber this element requires the accused to be aware  
 
(i) that his or her role is essential to the implementation of the common plan, and hence 
in the commission of the crime, and 
(ii) the he or she can – by reason of the essential nature of his or her task – frustrate the 
implementation of the common plan, and hence the commission of the crime, be 
refusing to perform the task assigned to him or her.
157
 
 
Aiding and Abetting 
 
Sub-paragraph (c) of Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute assigns a high threshold of mens 
rea for the aiders and abettors, „which goes beyond the ordinary mens rea requirement 
within the meaning of Article 30.‟158 Accordingly, Article 25(3)(c) limits the 
accomplice liability to instances in which there exists the purpose of promoting or 
facilitating the commission of the offence. If that is the case, the prosecution must 
demonstrate that the aider and abettor‟s conscious objective is to facilitate the 
commission of the crime.  
It is worth pointing out that the phrase „for the purpose of facilitating‟, as it 
appears in the very beginning of sub-paragraph (c), is borrowed from § 2.06(3)(a) of 
the Model Penal Code. The issue, whether a lower culpable mental state than that 
required for the principal perpetrator should be assigned to the aider and abettor, was 
heavily criticised by the commentators of the Model Penal Code as „incongruous and 
unjust‟.159 They assured that „the culpability level for the accomplice should be higher 
than that of the principal actor, because there is generally more ambiguity in the overt 
conduct engaged in by the accomplice, and thus a higher risk of convicting the 
innocent.‟160 
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Reading Article 25(3)(c) together with Article 30, it was questioned whether the 
conjunctive formulation (intent and knowledge) provided in the latter provision runs 
directly counter to international jurisprudence that an aider and abettor „need not share 
the same mens rea of the principal perpetrator (e.g. intent to kill), and that a “knowing 
participation in the commission of an offence” or awareness of the act of participation 
coupled with a conscious decision to participate” is sufficient.‟161 The problem could 
be approached in two ways. The first approach is proposed by Piragoff in his 
commentary on Article 30 of the ICC Statute:   
 
It is submitted that the conjunctive formulation has not altered this jurisprudence, but merely reflects 
the fact that aiding and abetting by an accused requires both knowledge of the crime being committed 
by the principal and some intentional conduct by the accused that constitutes the participation. Even if 
a strict literal reading of the conjunctive in paragraph 1 were made such that an accomplice must intend 
the consequence committed by the principal, the same interpretative result would occur. Article 30 
para. 2(b) makes it clear that “intent” may be satisfied by an awareness that a consequence will occur in 
the ordinary course of events. This same type of awareness can also satisfy the mental element of 
“knowledge”, as defined in Article 30 para. 3. Therefore, if both “intent” and “knowledge” are required 
on the part of an accomplice, these mental elements can be satisfied by such awareness. Therefore, 
article 30 confirms the existing international jurisprudence.
162
   
 
The second approach relies on recent judgments delivered by the two ad hoc 
Tribunals in which the Appeals and Trial Chambers demand some sort of volitional 
element in addition to the knowledge requirement.
163
 Yet, in the Orić case, it was held 
that aiding and abetting must be intentional in the sense that „the aider and abettor 
must have double intent, namely both with regard to the furthering effect of his own 
contribution and the intentional completion of the crime by the principal 
perpetrator.‟164  
As far as the objective elements of aiding and abetting are concerned, Schabas 
noted that Article 25(3)(c) „does not provide any indication as to whether there is 
some quantitative degree of aiding and abetting required to constitute the actus reus of 
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complicity.‟165 In sum, while sub-paragraph (c) provides for relatively low objective 
requirements of aiding and abetting, it assigns a relatively high subjective 
threshold.
166
    
 
Common Purpose  
 
Unlike the Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court makes explicit reference to the theory of „group criminality‟ (common 
purpose). Sub-paragraph (d) of Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute introduces the concept 
of „common purpose‟, as a punishable mode of criminal conduct in the following 
words: 
 
In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such crime by a group of 
persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, 
where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.167 
 
The first words of Article 25(3)(d) has been subject to different interpretations. The 
words „[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of 
such crime‟ was viewed by Professor Albin Eser as well as the Lubanga PTC as 
providing for a „residual form of accessory liability‟.168 Aware that Article 25(3)(d) of 
the ICC Statute provides for secondary participation as opposed to perpetration, the 
ICC Prosecutor, in the Document Containing the Charges in the Lubanga case, 
submitted that „common purpose‟ could properly be considered as a third applicable 
mode of criminal liability.‟169 Yet if that is the case, „common purpose‟ as provided 
for in Article 25(3)(d) will always be the last resort for the ICC Prosecutor and will 
not be his “darling notion” as the case of joint criminal enterprise under the 
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jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals. Whether the International 
Criminal Court will adhere to such interpretation by its PTC I, or whether it will 
interpret “common purpose” in the same way as it is interpreted under the 
jurisprudence of the two ad hoc Tribunals, is yet to be ascertained.  
It might be held that „common purpose‟ as a mode of criminal participation 
under Article 25(3)(d) will be appropriate to apply in situations which Professor 
Cassese named „liability for participation in an institutionalized common criminal 
plan‟.170 He states:  
 
Plainly, in an internment camp where inmates are severely ill-treated and even tortured, not only the 
head of the camp, but also his senior aides and those who physically inflict torture and other inhumane 
treatment are responsible. Also those who discharge administrative duties indispensable for the 
achievement of the camp‟s main gaols (for example, to register the incoming inmates, record their 
death, give them medical treatment or provide them with food) may incur criminal liability. They bear 
this responsibility so long as they are aware of the serious abuses being perpetrated (knowledge) and 
willingly take part in the functioning of the institution. That they should be held responsible is only 
logical and natural; by fulfilling their administrative or other operational tasks, they contribute to the 
commission of crimes. Without their willing support, crimes could not be perpetrated. Thus, however 
marginal their role, they constitute an indispensable cog in the murdering machinery.
171
    
 
As noted above, Article 21 of the ICC Statute establishes a hierarchy of applicable 
law to be applied by judges of the International Criminal Court. According to Article 
21(1)(a) of the ICC Statute, the Court shall apply in the first place its Statute,
172
 and in 
the second place „applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of international law of armed conflict.‟173 It is 
undeniable that the International Criminal Court will resort to the symmetric 
jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals in order to shape this mode of 
„group criminality‟ under Article 25(3)(d). However, the ICC will encounter a legal 
dilemma if it adopts literally the three categories of joint criminal enterprise as 
developed in the case law of two ad hoc Tribunals.
174
 This difficulty stems from the 
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fact that the subjective elements provided for in Article 25(3) sub-paragraphs (d)(i) 
(aim of furthering the criminal activity of the group) and (d)(ii) (knowledge of the 
intention of the group) will stand up against any application of the „extended form‟ of 
joint criminal enterprise (JCE III).
175
 
 
Article 30 vis-à-vis Superior Responsibility – Article 28 
 
Article 28 of the ICC Statute sets forth two different levels of culpability regarding 
military and civilians commanders. As for the military commanders, or persons 
effectively acting as military commanders, Article 28(a)(i) of the ICC Statute assigns 
both actual knowledge (knew) or constructive knowledge (should have known). The 
term „should have known‟ which is akin to negligence – a type of legal fault not 
necessarily involving a mental state – differs from the language employed in Articles 
7(3)/6(3) of the ICTY/ICTR Statutes. There, the term „had reason to know‟ is set out 
as a second alternative of knowledge which has to be proved on the part of the 
commander. It appears that the drafters of the ICTY/ICTR Statutes unlike those of the 
ICC Statute have carefully read the travaux préparatoires of Article 86 (then Art. 76 
– Failure to Act) of Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. During the 
preparatory work of the first Additional Protocol many delegations expressed their 
concerns regarding the inclusion of the phrase „should have known‟ in then Article 
76.
176
 Syria submitted an amendment suggesting the deletion of the phrase „should 
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have known‟.177 This was endorsed by the delegation of Argentina who drew the 
working group‟s attention to the fact that „penal responsibility should be interpreted 
in a very clear sense‟ and that the phrase „should have known‟, as it appears in the 
ICRC draft, „introduced a lack of clarity with regard to the conduct of superiors‟.178 
He concluded by saying that the phrase „would be tantamount to reserving the 
responsibility for submitting proof, which would be incompatible with the 
presumption of innocence common to all Latin American legal systems‟.179  
 At the Rome Conference, and as far as the requisite mens rea for command 
responsibility was concerned, the United States submitted a proposal in which it 
distinguished between the levels of culpability required for military commanders and 
civilian superiors: 
 
An important feature in military command responsibility and one that was unique in a criminal context 
was the existence of negligence as a criterion of knew or should have known that the forces under his 
control were going to commit a criminal act. ... The negligence standard was not appropriate in a 
civilian context and was basically contrary to the usual principles of criminal law responsibility.
180
 
 
Israel supported the United States‟ proposal in principle, but suggested the insertion 
of the words „or ought to have known‟ after „knew‟ in subparagraph (b)(i) of article 
25 as set out in the Preparatory Committee‟s 1998 draft statute.181 In the view of the 
Israeli delegate, this would establish „the principle that a superior not only had actual 
knowledge but also what he would term “constructive‟” knowledge, in other words, 
being equally responsible for failing to appreciate facts which he or she was in a 
position to know.‟182 
Recent jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals has stressed 
that „criminal negligence is not a basis of liability in the context of criminal 
responsibility.‟183 These evolutionary developments in the law of command 
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responsibility were endorsed by PTC I in Lubanga. In discussing the Elements of war 
crime of using, conscripting or enlisting children, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered 
the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc Tribunals and concluded that the expression „had 
reason to know‟ is stricter than the one of „should have known‟ because the former 
„does not criminalize the military superior‟s lack of due diligence to comply with 
their duty to be informed of their subordinates‟ activities.‟184 Rather the „had reason 
to know‟ requirement „can be met only if military superiors have, at the very 
minimum, specific information available to them to the need to start an 
investigation.‟185 Accordingly, „a superior will be criminally responsible through the 
principles of superior responsibility only if information was available to him which 
would have put him in notice of offences committed by subordinates.‟186 Thus, one 
might discern that neglect of a duty to acquire such knowledge, does not feature in the 
provision of Article 28(1) as a separate offence, and a superior is not therefore liable 
under the provision for such failures but only for failing to take necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent or to punish.
187
 
In light of the aforementioned, and reading Article 28(a) together with Article 
30(3), it appears that while the first alternative of knowledge assigned to the military 
commander would meet the knowledge standard, the second alternative (should have 
known) would not. In such a situation the proviso „unless otherwise provided‟ will 
come into play and the second alternative of Article 28(a) „should have known‟ would 
prevail.  
Paragraph 2 of Article 28 assigns a recklessness standard (consciously 
disregard information) with regard to the civilian superiors. This language is akin to 
the Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c). It is observed that the requirement that the actor 
consciously disregard the risk is the most significant part of the definition of 
recklessness under the Model Penal Code. It is this concept which differentiates a 
reckless actor from a negligent one.
188
 The negligent actor is a person who fails to 
perceive a risk that he ought to perceive. The reckless actor is a person who perceives 
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or is conscious of the risk but disregards it.
189
 Hence, in many offences where the law 
provides that recklessness is the minimum level of culpability, negligence will not 
suffice. Accordingly, „the distinction between „conscious disregard‟ and „failure to 
perceive‟ will often signify the difference between conviction and acquittal.‟190  
 
Article 30 vis-à-vis Mistake of Law and Mistake of Fact  
 
Article 32 of the Rome Statute is the first provision ever in the sphere of international 
criminal law which expressly recognises mistakes either of fact or law as grounds of 
excluding criminal responsibility. It is worth noting that the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Charters, as well as the Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals, lack a general provision 
on the subject.  
Paragraph 1 of Article 32 recognises the well-established principle ignorantia 
facti excusat. It provides that „a mistake of fact shall be ground for excluding criminal 
responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by the crime.‟191 While 
the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 32 reiterates the Latin maxim  
ignorantia juris non excusta, the second sentence of the same paragraph assures „a 
mistake of law may, however, be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it 
negates the mental element …‟192 In his commentary on Article 32 Triffterer had this 
to say:  
 
The difference between mistake of fact and mistake of law is that in principle in the latter case the 
perpetrator is not mistaken about the existence of a (purely) material element of fact; therefore, 
mistakes about legal aspects of a crime in general do not touch the material elements or material 
prerequisites for justification or excuse.‟193 
 
On closer inspection, one might consider Article 32(1) to be superfluous as long as 
the default rule of Article 30(1) of the ICC Statute stands as a safeguard for excluding 
the criminal responsibility in situations where the material elements of a particular 
crime are not committed with intent and knowledge. But in situations where the 
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factual or circumstantial elements of a particular crime are satisfied by a lower 
threshold than that of intent and knowledge (i.e. negligence) a defence of mistake of 
fact will not come into play.  That is to say that all crimes within the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court which in their elements contain the 
phrase „should have known‟ (i.e. Elements of Crimes of article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 
8(2)(e)(vii)) will stand against the defence of mistake of fact. This might be the 
reason why Lubanga refrained from claiming error regarding the age of the victim 
concerned, and instead raised the defence of mistake of law.  
The first test of Article 32(2) – mistake of law – was conducted by the PTC I 
in the Lubanga case. There the Defence argued that Lubanga was unaware that 
voluntarily or forcibly recruiting children under the age of fifteen years entailed his 
criminal responsibility under the ICC Statute since the law was not „accessible‟ or 
„foreseeable‟ for Lubanga by that time.194 Schabas noted that „although the argument 
was framed as one of retroactivity, it looks more like a claim of ignorance of the 
law.‟195 
The PTC I observed that „the scope of a mistake of law within the meaning of 
Article 32(2) is relatively limited.‟196 The Chamber went further asserting that in the 
absence of a plea under Article 33 of the ICC Statute, „the defence of mistake of law 
can succeed under Article 32 of the Statute only if Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was 
unaware of a normative objective element of the crime as a result of not realising its 
social significance (its everyday meaning).‟197 Professor Thomas Weigend disagreed 
with the PTC I. His fruitful explanation on the subject merits lengthy quotation: 
„Normative terms, such as „conscripting or enlisting‟, by definition have no „everyday 
meaning‟ that some one could „realise‟. To have the required intent, all the actor 
needs to understand is what the normative term in question signifies. In casu, if 
Lubanga knew that „conscripting or enlisting‟, although referring to a body of military 
law that he may or may not have been aware of, covers all forms of accepting the 
military service of young persons, then he knew enough to commit the offence with 
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intent.‟198 He continued: „All that Article 32(2) ICC Statute does is to equate the 
misconception of a normative element (such as „conscripting or enlisting‟) of an 
offence with the misconception of a factual element (such as „under the age of 15 
years‟).‟ In either case, Weigend continued, „the defendant cannot be convicted if he 
was unaware that his conduct met the definition of the offence, either because he 
thought that the young recruits were 16 years old (factual mistake) or that he did not 
„conscript or enlist‟ anyone because these technical terms, in his mind, only covered 
forcible recruitment (normative mistake).
199
  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This study reveals the dominant character of the mental element – Article 30 – within 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Since its integration into the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 30 has been subject to different 
interpretations by legal scholars and commentators. However, one of the major 
advantages of Article 30 is that it assigns different levels of culpability to each of the 
material element of the crimes under the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court – 
element analysis as opposed to offence analysis. Thus, the general rule under this 
provision is the full coverage of the material elements by the corresponding mental 
elements.  
At present, the only decision rendered by the International Criminal Court on 
substantive issues, since its creation on 1 July 2002, shed some light on the meaning 
of intent (dolus) despite some shortcomings.
200
 As for the mens rea standards under 
Article 30 of the ICC Statute, the Lubanga PTC I interpreted that provision to include 
the three categories of dolus, namely dolus directus of the first and second degrees 
and dolus eventualis.  
Our examination also reveals that there are exceptions regarding the 
application of the default rule of intent and knowledge to the crimes within the ratione 
materiae of the International Criminal Court. The Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber has 
affirmed that the ICC Elements of Crimes can by themselves “provide otherwise”.    
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The Chamber considered that the fault element of negligence, as set out in the 
Elements of Crimes for particular offences, can be an exception to the intent and 
knowledge standard provided in Article 30(1) of the ICC Statute.
201
 In such situations, 
where conviction depends upon proof that the perpetrator had „reasonable cause‟ to 
believe or suspect some relevant fact, the prosecution has not much to do and the 
burden of proof, arguably, will lie upon the defendant. Such practice will inevitably 
infringe one of the most fundamental rights of the accused, namely the presumption of 
innocence. One might recall paragraph 3 of Article 66 of the ICC Statute which 
stipulates: „In order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt 
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt‟202 Denying such a fundamental principle 
which is well founded in Islamic law nearly 1400 years ago is considered one step 
backward for the future of international criminal justice. The Prophet once said: 
„eliminate the prescribed punishments whenever it is possible: and if you can manage 
a dismissal of a Muslim [the accused] do it. It is better for Imam [judge] to be 
mistaken in pardon than to be mistaken in penalty.‟203 Islamic jurists (scholars) gave 
this rule a great importance, as it is corresponding to the spirit of the Islamic Shari‟a 
regarding protection of a person from harm and observation of his interest.
204
 
At present, mens rea or the mental element – the most significant factor in 
determining criminal responsibility– is still one of the most complex areas of 
international criminal law, in most part because so many imprecise and vague terms 
have been used to define this fault element. Suffice to say that in many cases the 
conviction or acquittal of an accused appearing before the ICC will depend on the 
interpretation of Article 30 and its relationship with other provisions in the ICC 
Statute. At present, numerous judgments rendered by national and international courts 
have paved the way for a better understanding of the complex notion of mens rea in 
the sphere of international criminal law.
205
 It is now up to the International Criminal 
Court to illuminate it. 
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